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Structural, legal, and financial constraints have brought the U.S.
Postal Service (USPS) to the brink of breakdown in the past decade.
Faced by declining business brought about by the e-mail revolution
and competition from private express companies, the Postal Service
has repeatedly requested assistance from the federal government.
This culminated in December 2006 with the passage of the Postal
Accountability and Enhancement Act, which introduces modest re-
visions in the pricing and service policies of the Postal Service so as to
make it a self-sustaining government corporation. But will it?
Although the new legislation addresses some of the problems of the
Postal Service, more radical changes may be necessary in the future.
One possibility is the complete privatization of the Postal Service
including the removal of the legal monopoly that it has on the delivery
of letter mail, so as to foster competition in the mail delivery. Because
these remedies are currently too controversial for Congress to imple-
ment, their chances of being enacted in the near future are dim. In-
stead, what is emerging is a partial approach to privatization in which
the Postal Service forms worksharing agreements with private-sector
firms to take advantage of their efficiencies. Whether such partial
privatization will significantly improve the efficiency of mail delivery
remains to be seen. This article discusses the nature and operation of
the Postal Service and assesses the merits of its possible reforms.
The U.S. Postal Service
According to critics, it’s time to force the U.S. Postal Service to
compete. They note that even with a statutory monopoly, the Postal
Service can’t make ends meet. For fiscal year 2006, the agency lost
about $2 billion and these losses are likely to continue (U.S. Postal
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Service 2006). The President’s Commission on the U.S. Postal Service
forecasted that, even after assuming that postal rates continue to
increase with inflation and considering the cost-saving measures cur-
rently in effect, the Postal Service will realize an annual deficit of $4.5
billion by 2012, increasing to a deficit of $8.5 billion by 2017 (Presi-
dent’s Commission on the U.S. Postal Service 2003).
Also, the Postal Service has accumulated about $75 billion in un-
funded liabilities, mostly money promised to employees in retirement
and health benefits as the result of generous contract settlements.
This is similar to General Motors, Ford Motor Company, and
Chrysler, whose legacy costs have pushed them toward bankruptcy.
The May 2007 rate hike for mailing a one-ounce letter, to 41 cents,
was intended to generate additional revenues to fund these liabilities
and the rising operating costs of the Postal Service.
To understand the financial difficulties of the Postal Service, we
must first consider its structure and method of operation. The Postal
Service is an independent agency of the federal government. Accord-
ing to its 2006 annual report, as the government’s largest civilian
employer, with a nationwide network that delivers more than 200
billion pieces of mail each year, the Postal Service is a vital part of the
nation’s communication network. To fulfill its mission, the Postal
Service has a massive infrastructure that includes about 735,000 full-
time workers and 115,000 part-time workers. Also, the Postal Ser-
vice’s physical network is massive, with about 38,000 retail postal
outlets, 446 mail processing facilities, and 215,000 vehicles. The
Postal Service handles a wide variety of mail items ranging from
correspondence to packages. Almost 90 percent of domestic mail is
generated by businesses, with households accounting for the remain-
ing 10 percent (U.S. Postal Service 2006).
Postage rates vary widely, depending on the mail’s content, weight,
size, destination, and how it is prepared and presented by mailers to
the Postal Service. Mail is organized into groupings called classes. The
four main classifications of mail consist of (1) First-Class Mail, which
includes items such as business and personal correspondence, bills,
payments, and advertisements; (2) Standard Mail, which is mainly
advertising mail such as catalogs, coupons, and solicitations; (3) Pe-
riodicals, which include mailed newspapers and magazines; and (4)
Package Service, which is mainly small packages. The authority to set
postage rates is granted to the Postal Service’s Board of Governors,
which announces proposed rates. The federal Postal Rate Commis-
sion must review the proposal, but its approval is not required to
implement a hike. Thus, the Postal Service is in a good position to
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pass higher costs along to taxpayers via its requests for additional
revenue.
Although the Postal Service competes against private express firms
in the delivery of packages and express mail, it has a legal monopoly
over both the delivery of letters and the use of the customer’s mail-
box. The Postal Service maintains that this protection is necessary for
it to provide its public service obligations, such as universal service
and uniform rates.
Another characteristic of the Postal Service is its break-even man-
date. Thus, when the Postal Service proposes changes to postage
rates, it projects its revenue requirement for a particular period based
on its total estimated costs plus a provision for contingencies, and
then proposes rates that are estimated to raise sufficient revenues to
meet its revenue requirement. This means that the Postal Service is
supposed to be self-financing and receive no regular cash subsidy.
However, the current business model of the Postal Service, which
relies on increasing mail volumes to mitigate postal rate increases and
cover the Postal Service’s rising costs, is at risk in today’s environment
of greater competition and communication alternatives. In spite of
numerous rate increases and cost-cutting efforts, the Postal Service
has incurred substantial deficits as its volumes have declined. More-
over, uncertainties such as the effects of a slowing economy, the
extent of diversion to electronic alternatives, the rise of private ex-
press competitors such as Federal Express (FedEx) and United Par-
cel Service (UPS), and new mandates to enhance the safety and
security of the mail have adversely affected postal finances and will
likely continue to do so in the future.
Although some reforms have been made to improve the efficiency
of the Postal Service (Schuyler 2007), they have not resolved the
fundamental challenges that it faces. Instead, a stronger revision of
the Postal Service’s business model may be needed so as to inject
additional market incentives into its culture. This might be attempted
by complete privatization of the Postal Service, although political
realities likely prevent this from occurring in the near future. Instead,
the statutory monopoly granted to the Postal Service on the delivery
of letter mail could be repealed in order for the Postal Service to
compete against private companies that deliver letters. These propos-
als go beyond the wishes of the Postal Service, which prefers that
reforms be minor and remain within its existing authority. In other
countries, however, such reforms are already underway. For example,
the European Union intends to privatize all of its national postal
services by 2009. Also, private-sector couriers have been allowed to
capture more than half the mail delivery business in India.
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Universal Postal Service
As part of its public service mandate, the Postal Service is required
to provide universal service to its customers. This means that it makes
postal service available to the entire population of the United States,
regardless of distance or one’s ability to pay. This requirement is
similar to obligations the federal government places on other regu-
lated industries, including telecommunications, railroads, and electric
power. The universal service obligation of the Postal Service suggests
ubiquity of access to the mail either by delivery or other means, and
reasonable access to collection and counter service. Universal service
also means that rates are the same regardless of where you send your
mail to or receive it from: Everyone in every part of the country gets
the same type of mail service for the same price. Thus, a 41-cent
stamp is all that is needed to mail a one-ounce letter from, say, Seattle
to Boston or any other locale in the United States. Finally, universal
service suggests uniform frequency of delivery: People living in cities
and rural areas receive mail delivery six days a week.
The modern concept of the Postal Service’s universal service obli-
gation did not exist in the early days of the United States. Until the
mid-1800s, the Postal Service was considered an intercity carrier that
provided no collection or delivery of mail. Service was provided only
to towns on post roads designated by Congress. Outlying villages and
settlements were not included in the network. City delivery was not
introduced until 1863, and then only in 45 cities.
The universality of mail delivery became a theme of the Postal
Service with the introduction of “rural free delivery.” This was the
policy of providing free mail delivery to the homes of farmers out in
the country so they wouldn’t have to travel into town to get their mail
and stamps. Prior to rural free delivery, the 30 million Americans who
lived in rural areas had to travel to the nearest post office to send and
receive mail, and often these post offices were miles away. Rural free
delivery was thus a response to the notion that rural Americans were
as entitled to having mail brought to their homes as were their city-
dwelling counterparts. Although rural free delivery was introduced in
the late 1800s, it was not realized until well into the 1900s. Rural free
delivery meant that farmers did not have to live so near a post office
and thus began a long and steady decline of rural postal offices
throughout the 1900s.
Over time, the nature of universal service has changed. Multiple
daily deliveries in cities were eliminated in the early 1950s. Postage
rates for local and long-distance letters were not equalized until 1885,
and they diverged again in 1932 only to be set equal again in 1944.
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The American public has generally favored the preservation of
universal service, defined as six-day per week delivery of letters ev-
erywhere in the nation at uniform, affordable prices and ready access
to post offices in every community. However, the sizable operating
deficits of the Postal Service call to question whether this level of
service can be maintained in the future. A redefinition of universal
service may have to occur that allows for reductions in service, in-
cluding the closing of unneeded post offices and reducing deliveries
on high-cost rural routes from six days each week to five or four days.
The Postal Monopoly
To help the Postal Service fulfill its universal service obligation, the
federal government provides it a legal monopoly on the delivery of
“letter mail.” This policy has resulted in much controversy surround-
ing the operation of the Postal Service.
Although the Constitution provides the federal government with
the power to establish post offices and designate roads on which the
mail would pass (i.e., post roads), it does not require that the carrier
of mail be a monopoly, much less a government monopoly. Since the
late 1700s, however, the government has consistently mandated that
a monopoly be granted to its Postal Service on the delivery of letters.
This desire initially stemmed from fear of loss of postal revenues from
competition at a time when every available dollar was necessary to
fund an infant government, especially during times of war. As time
passed, the monopoly power of the Postal Service was used to extract
revenues that could be used to subsidize frontier postal routes, thus
facilitating postal expansion. Monopoly postal revenues also became a
source of funds that government officials used to distribute to mem-
bers of Congress and their friends in order to gain support for favored
legislation (Olds 1995).
To discourage competition from private mail companies, the fed-
eral government passed several laws during the late 1700s and early
1800s that strengthened the postal monopoly. Fines were imposed on
companies that transported mail in violation of federal law. In spite of
these fines, private carriers, encouraged by high postal rates of the
government’s post office, ignored the law and used the rail and steam-
ship lines for mail delivery. By 1844, private companies accounted for
two-thirds of the country’s mail carriage (Priest 1975).
The federal government reacted to this situation by enacting the
Postal Act of 1845, the so-called “private express statues.” These laws
prohibited private companies from carrying letters for hire, and they
essentially remain the law today. They grant the federal government
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a monopoly in the delivery of “letter mail.” Potential competitors can
go to jail if they carry letters. However, the monopoly does not extend
to other classifications of mail such as newspapers, magazines, adver-
tising, or packages. The private express statutes provide the Postal
Service the enviable position of being able to determine the extent of
its own monopoly by defining what constitutes a “letter.”
The Postal Service has used two arguments to justify its legal mo-
nopoly on mail delivery. The first is that mail delivery constitutes a
natural monopoly. A “natural monopoly” is defined in economics as
an industry where the fixed cost of capital goods is so high that it is not
profitable for a second firm to enter and compete. Since the average
cost of serving customers is always decreasing, a larger firm will more
efficiently serve the entire customer base. A monopoly in this industry
occurs naturally because if there is more than one firm in the indus-
try, either the firms will merge to realize economies of scale or one
firm will expand its output while its competitors, unable to achieve
the firm’s lower costs of production, will cease production. Monopoly
will always result.
According to the governors of the Postal System, the postal indus-
try has the cost characteristics of a natural monopoly, and thus it is
more efficient and less costly for all letter delivery to be provided by
the Postal Service than by many firms. For example, mail delivery
involves a network, and network externalities suggest that one big
network serving a given area will, other things being equal, be more
efficient than many overlapping networks providing the same service.
Thus, if a competitive postal market is left alone, it is likely that one
competitor will eventually win out to control all, or nearly all, of the
market. This appears to be the case in a number of advanced coun-
tries where postal competition has been introduced, such as Sweden
and New Zealand.
However, the Postal Service did not evolve as a natural monopoly,
gradually increasing its size, taking advantage of economies of scale,
and eliminating competitors. Instead, persistent legislation of the fed-
eral government was needed to eliminate private companies that
sprang up over the years to meet consumers’ demands for faster,
more secure, and less expensive delivery service. The notion that a
natural monopoly should require legal barriers against competitors in
order to survive is unclear. Also, there is virtually no evidence that
suggests the Postal Service realizes substantial economies of scale; at
best there may be minor economies of scale in delivery of letter mail
and in letter processing (Panzar 1991). Simply put, the natural mo-
nopoly argument of the Postal Service is not a convincing one.
The most durable argument for the Postal Service’s monopoly
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relates to its universal service obligation. When the private express
statutes were passed in 1845, members of Congress argued that pri-
vate companies would never provide mail service to sparsely popu-
lated areas. Instead, they would “skim the cream” by maintaining only
profitable routes, thus leaving the government with unprofitable rural
routes and substantial losses. Therefore, the principal justification
given for legally prohibiting the carriage of letters by private compa-
nies was to preserve the implicit subsidy to rural routes.
More recent support of the private express statutes occurred in
1973 when the newly reorganized Postal Service noted that if the
private express statutes were repealed, private enterprise, unlike the
Postal Service, would be free to move into the most economically
attractive markets while avoiding markets that are less attractive from
a business standpoint (U.S. Congress 1973). Without abandoning the
policy of self-sufficiency and providing the Postal Service massive
subsidies, it is hard to see how the Postal Service could meet rate and
service objectives in the face of cream-skimming competition against
its major product. This argument is still used by the Postal Service to
justify its legal monopoly for letter mail.
However, the universal service argument for monopoly power has
its limitations. Basic economics suggests that rural customers are un-
likely to be without service under competition. Instead, they would
simply have to pay the true cost of delivery to them, which may or
may not be lower than under monopoly. There are several highly
efficient delivery services, such as FedEx and UPS, which frequently
cover these same routes. Also, notions of fairness imply that rural
customers should not be subsidized by city customers. To the extent
that people make choices about where they live, they should assume
the cost of that decision. If the cost of providing mail service to rural
customers exceeds the cost of providing service to city customers,
then rural customers should be expected to pay more. Finally, it is
contestable that government monopoly is needed to ensure mail ser-
vice to rural areas. Instead, the government could award competitive
contracts to private firms for that service (Geddes 2005).
Costs of the Postal Monopoly
The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the Postal Service
to be self-financing, which means that it must break even over time
and receive no regular cash subsidies. Compared to private express
companies, however, the Postal Service receives many subsidies from
the government. It pays no federal, state, or local taxes on its income,
sales, purchases, or property. Unlike private companies, it is immune
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from most forms of regulation, such as antitrust, motor vehicle reg-
istration, parking tickets, zoning, and land use restrictions. It is also
able to borrow money at the lowest possible rate through the U.S.
Treasury. Moreover, private companies that compete with the Postal
Service in package delivery are hindered by the fact that mailboxes by
law are the private resource of the Postal Service. Understandably,
private companies facing competition from the Postal Service main-
tain that they are at a great disadvantage.
A rate structure based on cross subsidization is another source of
inefficiency for the Postal Service. It is often argued that for the
Postal Service, high-density urban mail delivery subsidizes low-
density rural delivery. The subsidy from urban to rural users is mainly
due to the distance the mail travels and the costs of delivering it.
Although costs vary with distance and destination, all letter mail is
priced at the same rate based on average cost. This is, in effect, a
subsidy for rural and long-distance delivery that is paid for largely by
shippers of letter mail within urban areas. Such cross subsidization
would not occur in a competitive market where price reflects the
actual cost of service. However, not everyone agrees with this argu-
ment. They note that as a group, the cost of serving rural routes is
about the same as urban routes. The reason is that rural carriers
typically drive their vehicles along an entire route while urban letter
carriers park their vehicles and then walk a route. The per letter
delivery costs of driving tend to be less than the per letter costs of
walking, thus offsetting the effects of urban density on delivery cost
(Bernard et al. 2002). The high gasoline prices of 2007 provide sup-
port for this argument.
Another concern comes from private express companies, which
maintain that letter mail delivered by the Postal Service cross subsi-
dizes some or all of the other classifications. This allows the Postal
Service to transfer revenue it derives from its monopoly on letters to
battle in more competitive markets such as packages, overnight mail,
and express mail. By cross-subsidizing its package service, for ex-
ample, the Postal Service can offer artificially low prices for its de-
livery and thus realize an unfair competitive advantage over private
couriers. Normally, this cross subsidization would be considered
predatory monopolistic conduct, and illegal. But the Postal Service is
exempt from antitrust law (Smith 1999).
The Postal Service also faces challenges in containing its operating
cost. Because the Postal Service receives indirect subsidies from the
government, such as freedom from taxation and regulation, and be-
cause its goal is to break even rather than to earn a competitive rate
of return, it has less incentive than private companies to use capital
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and resources efficiently. Subsidies make government products and
service appear artificially cheap, resulting in an overallocation of re-
sources that could be used to produce greater benefits elsewhere in
the economy. Economic theory maintains that such a misallocation
reduces national economic welfare below that achieved by a competi-
tive market. When private companies produce and sell a product or
service, there is some benefit to society from the taxes that result.
This benefit is not gained when the government produces the same
product or service.
Finally, the Postal Service must deal with “X-inefficiency.” In con-
structing a firm’s cost curve, economists assume that the firm pays
prices for inputs and uses the technologies that allow it to realize the
lowest average cost of whatever level of output it desires to produce.
X-inefficiency occurs when a firm’s actual cost of producing any out-
put is greater than the lowest possible cost of producing it. Presum-
ably, firms in competitive industries are under pressure from rivals,
forcing them to be internally efficient to survive. But monopolists are
sheltered from competitive forces by barriers to entry, and that ab-
sence of pressure tends to result in X-inefficiency (Leibenstein 1966).
Consistent with the principle of X-inefficiency, the costs of the
Postal Service are noticeably higher than they need to be because of
its limited incentive to hold down labor costs. Postal workers gener-
ally belong to well-organized and politically savvy labor unions that
extract generous packages of wages, benefits, and work rules. This
results in postal workers receiving a “compensation premium,” earn-
ing greater wages and benefits than workers performing comparable
work in the private sector. The wage premium is about 21 percent
and the total compensation premium, including wages and benefits, is
about 34 percent (Wachter 2004). In other words, unionized postal
workers receive 34 percent more in compensation than is received by
comparable private-sector workers. The attractiveness of this com-
pensation premium is reinforced by the fact that Postal Service jobs
are highly sought after, and once obtained, are held onto. Applicant
queues are long, and the quit rate is all but nonexistent. Employees
represented by postal unions have a very high degree of job security,
a generous benefit package, and wages that have kept up with infla-
tion.
Cost increases have also resulted from failure of the Postal Service
to significantly increase productivity, which has risen only 11 percent
in 30 years (Congressional Budget Office 2005). For example, postal
work rules tend to discourage cooperation between management and
labor to increase productivity. The reward for a letter carrier who
finishes his or her route early is to be assigned to finish another route.
THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE
467
Moreover, innovations of private express companies have shown
many ways for getting products more efficiently from one location to
another. They paved the way to express mail and overnight door-to-
door delivery of packages with friendly customer support to boot.
Although the Postal Service has spent billions of dollars on automa-
tion and information technology, productivity has not increased as
quickly or by as much as the Postal Service hoped. Simply put, the
gains from Postal Service automation continue to be small compared
to overall its labor costs, and are not high enough to justify the postal
compensation premium (Lendard 1994).
If the Postal Service operated in a competitive market, it would
have to get serious about cutting costs. Stamp prices would decrease,
or at least would increase at a slower rate than they have. Despite new
technology, such as modern readers/sorters that process over 30,000
pieces of mail per hour, stamp prices have risen with inflation since
1970. The increase in mail volume combined with scale economies
should have resulted in the average price of a stamp falling in real
terms. Rather than make the tough choices that it takes to cut costs,
the Postal Service repeatedly does what it always does when revenue
gets tight—lobby for an increase in stamp prices.
Long-Run Problems of the Postal Service
Whether or not the Postal Service can break even in the short term
by raising rates or deferring investments, there is growing consensus
that it faces a perilous long-term prospect that puts the preservation
of universal service at risk. The most important problem in the future
for the Postal Service is the pressure it faces from competition from
various electronic communication service providers. Better alterna-
tives to letter mail keep appearing, such as the telephone, e-mail, fax,
and electronic bills, statements, and remittances. Looking at postal
services around the world, fewer and fewer countries depend on a
monopolistic letter delivery business for survival. Moreover, private
delivery companies dominate the market for packages greater than
two pounds, and are making inroads into the market for small pack-
ages and express mail.
The long-run problems of the Postal Service include an outdated
business model, which relies on growth of mail volume to cover the
rising costs of its expanding delivery network (Crew and Kleindorfer
2003). This model is not aligned with current market realities that
limit the Postal Service’s ability to remain self-supporting while pro-
viding affordable, high-quality, and universal service. In particular,
first-class letter mail, the bread and butter of the Postal Service, is in
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decline and is expected to remain in decline because of the increasing
use of electronic substitutes.
The Postal Service is hampered by several serious problems. First,
is the inability of the Postal Service to attract highly qualified man-
agement. This is largely because of a salary cap on postal executive
salaries that is tied to the federal executive schedule. The Postal
Service contends that this cap constrains its ability to provide com-
pensation that is comparable to that in the private sector for mana-
gerial, executive, and officer-level positions, thus making it more dif-
ficult for the Postal Service to retain and recruit key talent who has
the interest and ability to help it become a successful business.
Second, an outdated regulatory regime is also detrimental to the
Postal Service. The Postal Service and its governors maintain that the
regulatory model established by the Postal Rate Commission is based
on control rather than market-based principles. For decades, they
have complained about their 10-month adversarial process to adjust
rates, when private-sector competitors not only can change rates on
short notice or seasonally, but also can offer special contract deals for
high-volume customers. The Postal Service contends that the sluggish
rate-determination process provides it no chance to respond to com-
petition, to alter rates with periods of low usage, or to set prices in
accordance with demand, instead of costs. Moreover, the Postal Ser-
vice has also faced substantial regulatory obstacles when it tries to be
innovative and introduce new products and services that would en-
hance its revenues.
Third, the Postal Service also suffers from rising labor costs. Cur-
rently, about 80 percent of the total cost of operating the Postal
Service stems from labor costs. These costs are associated with about
735,000 full-time postal employees, more than 80 percent of that
number being unionized. When management and labor cannot agree
on a package of wages, benefits, and work rules, a binding decision is
made by arbitration. The Postal Service maintains that arbitrators,
who are not accountable, tend to simply split the difference, which
promotes higher costs (President’s Commission on the U.S. Postal
Service 2003).
Fourth, the Postal Service lacks two major incentives for cost con-
tainment: It has no profit motive and is unable to go bankrupt. Top
management gets the same compensation whether or not costs are
reduced. It also appears reluctant to confront postal unions with
difficult issues relating to the reduction of costs by revising work rules
that lead to greater output per worker or cutting postal jobs. In fact,
management has a great disincentive to control labor costs. After each
major contract is negotiated, management salaries rise by a percentage
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roughly equal to bargaining-unit increases, surely a major disincentive
for tough bargaining. In the absence of growth in mail volume, sub-
stantial productivity increases will be required to offset cost due to
rising wages.
Fifth, the Postal Service has huge unfunded employee obligations
of about $75 billion over the 10-year period 2006–15, of which retiree
health benefits constitute $50 billion to $60 billion (Congressional
Budget Office 2006). These liabilities reflect postal employees having
among the most attractive benefits packages in the nation. The cur-
rent pay-as-you-go approach to funding these benefits will likely lead
to more dramatic and frequent postal rate increases in the future.
Finally, the Postal Service suffers from too many and too old postal
facilities. Post offices are often centers of community activity, and
efforts by the Postal Service to move, consolidate, or close them to
adapt to changing market conditions are controversial and met by
resistance. The Postal Service is prevented from closing small post
offices solely because they operate at a deficit, and it must go through
an elaborate and time consuming community consultation process
before closing an office. The Postal Service contends that over half of
its 38,000 facilities do not render sufficient revenues to cover their
costs, and complains that political factors prevent it from modernizing
its retail and distribution systems.
Should the Postal Service’s Monopoly Be Removed?
Should It Be Privatized?
These problems cast doubt on whether the Postal Service, as cur-
rently structured and operated, can be viable in the future. What
could be done to reform the Postal Service? As expected, the Postal
Service has been willing to propose only modest reforms of its busi-
ness model. Its objective is to become a “commercial government
enterprise,” which implies preserving government ownership of the
Postal Service, maintaining its legal monopoly on the delivery of let-
ters and access to the mailbox, but allowing it to operate under in-
creased businesslike conditions. There are several elements of this
commercialization strategy (U.S. Postal Service 2005):
• Lifting the moratorium on closing post offices, streamlining the
process for more closures, and reducing the number of process-
ing centers.
• Negotiating service agreements and volume discount prices with
the biggest mailers, exploring seasonal discounts and premiums,
and phasing in new rates on a more predictable basis.
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• Revamping contract talks with postal unions to escape binding
arbitration, and encouraging reasonable settlements with the
public’s interest paramount.
• Redefining universal service by adjusting service levels and the
number of delivery days to a more affordable level.
• Changes in the incentive structure to allow the Postal Service to
retain any excess earnings, and eliminate the limit on executive
pay tired to the federal executive schedule.
• Expanded freedom to use Postal Service assets for entering re-
lated markets and developing new products with skeptical scru-
tiny from the Postal Rate Commission.
Although this commercialization plan provides a more flexible busi-
ness model, it does not resolve the fundamental problems of the
Postal Service. This is because the plan alone does not subject the
Postal Service fully to the discipline of a competitive market. Without
such discipline, postal management is unlikely to cut costs and initiate
new product innovations that are needed to make the Postal Service
a successful commercial enterprise. To introduce additional market-
based incentives to postal delivery, the monopoly of the Postal Service
on the delivery of letter mail could be removed, as well as its control
over mailboxes. Also, the Postal Service could be privatized.
In its complete form, privatization would consist of the transfer of
ownership and control of the Postal Service from the public to the
private sector. All portions of the Postal Service would be transferred,
from mail collection to delivery. This could be accomplished by sell-
ing the assets of the Postal Service to private firms. Without a gov-
ernment monopoly, private firms would be free to enter and compete
for business. Proponents of this approach argue that incentives of
profit-oriented firms would result in costs lower than those of the
Postal Service. They cite studies concerning a variety of industries
that have generally found cost reductions of 20 percent to 50 percent
that resulted from privatization and increased competition. Among
the sources of the cost savings are better management techniques,
greater incentives to innovate, incentive pay structures, more efficient
deployment of workers, better and more productive equipment, and
greater use of part-time and temporary employees (Hilke 1992).
However, privatization of the Postal Service is controversial. Op-
ponents believe that certain parts of the economy, including postal
delivery, should remain closed to market exploitation in order to
protect them from the unpredictability and ruthlessness of the mar-
ket. For example, a private mail company will serve the needs of those
who are most willing and able to pay, as opposed to the needs of the
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majority. Opponents also believe that the profit maximization goal is
not compatible with postal delivery. They note that private couriers
tend to face a conflict between profitability and service levels, and
may overreact to short-run events by cutting back on staff costs to
stem losses. They also contend that the profit motive has an inherent
tendency toward corruption, such as embezzlement that was recently
practiced by employees of Enron. Simply put, the profit motive
should be subordinated to the social objective of providing a stable
system of mail delivery whose existence is of strategic importance to
the nation.
Indeed, the Postal Service is not an easy candidate for complete
privatization. Despite its limitations, most Americans depend on the
Postal Service for routine communications and do not relish the no-
tion of plunging into the unknown via privatization. Also, postal
unions see privatization as a threat to the generous work rules and
compensation levels of their members. To have any chance of being
implemented, an attempt to privatize the postal system would have to
be far more than a business plan that makes financial sense. It would
result in a political battle would include powerful, opposing interest
groups which influence the legislative process (Hudgins 1996).
Although complete privatization of the Postal Service has met
strong resistance in the United States, a wave of postal privatization is
sweeping Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, India, and else-
where. Efforts to privatize foreign postal systems are altering univer-
sal service and rates, the extent of postal monopoly, and the regulation
of postal prices. Consider these examples:
• Although New Zealand has not shed its government-owned
postal services company, in 1986 it abolished its postal monopoly,
allowing for full competition. The government requires its New
Zealand Post to maintain universal service, but not to charge
uniform rates.
• In 1994, the Netherlands privatized most of its postal service
when it sold off 52 percent of it to private investors. Though
mostly privately owned, the postal service company maintains a
monopoly over the carriage of letters weighing 500 grams or less.
• Like the Netherlands, Germany partially privatized its postal
services through a public stock offering. In 2002, the government
sold 31 percent of Deutsche Post in a public offering. The firm
retains a monopoly in the carriage of letters weighing 200 grams
or less and costing no more than five times the basic stamp price,
although the monopoly is scheduled to end in 2007.
• In 2005, the postal monopoly enjoyed by the French national
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carrier La Poste was reduced from letters weighing less than 100
grams or costing three times the basic stamp price to letters
weighing less than 50 grams or costing 2.5 times the basic stamp
price.
• In 2003, the European Union reduced its mail monopoly for all
members by reducing the size of a letter that national carriers are
allowed to monopolize from 350 grams to 50 grams, thus opening
up an additional 18 percent of the market to competition (Na-
tional Association of Letter Carriers 2005).
Similar to the United States, efforts to privatize foreign postal systems
have encountered stiff resistance, especially from postal workers who
fear loss of jobs as well as customers in rural areas who fear reduction
in service.
If privatization is to be seriously considered in the United States,
many issues would have to be resolved. Would the U.S. government
retain ownership in the privatized company, and would it be a ma-
jority or minority owner? Could foreign companies become part own-
ers of the privatized company? Should the privatized company be-
come employee-owned in order to improve incentives for workers to
increase productivity? What should be done to treat fairly the 850,000
people who work for the Postal Service in terms of wages, benefits,
and pensions? Questions such as these constitute formidable ob-
stacles that would have to be overcome if the Postal Service is to be
privatized.
Worksharing and Partial Privatization
Although the Postal Service thus far has successfully lobbied
against proposals for its complete privatization, it has gradually ac-
cepted the concept of partial privatization. This leaves intact the basic
governing structure of the Postal Service but allows for its shifting
some work to the private sector. For example, private firms who
submit the lowest bids do almost all of the long-haul trucking for the
Postal Service. Moreover, air transportation is provided under con-
tract and a sorting facility for express mail is operated under contract.
A number of contract stations also exist for postal retail services (Co-
hen et al. 2003).
Moreover, the Postal Service has adopted “worksharing” as a
method of capturing some of the private sector’s efficiencies. Work-
sharing refers to the exporting of work that otherwise would be per-
formed by the Postal Service to private-sector mailers, such as State
Farm Insurance and Bank of America. Thus, it reduces the Postal
THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE
473
Service’s workload for a given amount of mail. About 75 percent of
the domestic mail volume is workshared by mailers, especially for-
profit businesses. Nonprofit entities such as charitable organizations
and associations also generate substantial quantities of workshared
mail.
Key worksharing activities include barcoding and preparing mail so
it can be sorted by the automated equipment of the Postal Service,
which reduces manual sorting and other Postal Service handling of
the mail; presorting mail, such as by ZIP Code or specific delivery
location to reduce the number of times the Postal Service must sort
the mail to route it to the addressee; and entering mail at a Postal
Service facility that is generally closer to the final destination of the
mail. Also, mailers must perform numerous other worksharing activi-
ties, such as updating and properly formatting addresses to improve
their quality and accuracy, thus reducing the amount of undeliverable
and forwarded mail, as well as improving the Postal Service’s ability to
use its automated equipment to sort the mail.
In its support of worksharing, the President’s Commission on the
U.S. Postal Service has noted that those who can perform postal work
best and for the best price should have the job, regardless of whether
the best provider is the Postal Service and its existing workforce or a
private-sector company. This greater integration of the public and
private postal networks adds value to both. It also holds the possibility
of allowing the Postal Service to focus on its true core competency:
delivery of the mail the first and last mile that makes the Postal
Service unique (President’s Commission on the U.S. Postal Service
2003).
Because worksharing helps reduce the Postal Service’s costs, rate
discounts are given to mailers. These discounts equal the difference
between the rate for a single piece of first-class mail, weighing up to
1 ounce, and the corresponding rate applicable to workshared mail.
Discounts vary depending on the worksharing activities that are per-
formed and the degree of presorting, among other things. To qualify
for worksharing rates, mailers must perform worksharing activities
and meet minimum volume requirements for bulk mailings, such as
mailings of at least 500 letters sent via first-class mail that may include
credit card bills, utility bills, advertisements, and bank statements.
Aside from first-class mail that is workshared, other workshared mail
may include bulk mailings of advertisements, magazines, local news-
papers, or packages.
According to the Postal Service, worksharing benefits itself, mail-
ers, and the nation. By improving the operations of the Postal Service,
worksharing helps minimize its workforce and infrastructure, thus
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reducing its costs of operation. Rate discounts due to workshared
activities also stimulate mail-volume growth, which can help the
Postal Service achieve operating efficiencies. Analysts estimate that
without worksharing, Postal Service costs would be about 25 percent
higher (U.S. General Accounting Office 2003). For mailers, work-
sharing reduces total mail-related costs, helping to keep postage rates
more affordable. Finally, to the extent that business mailers pass
along lower prices to their consumers when their mail-related costs
are decreased by worksharing, economic welfare increases for the
nation. In spite of these advantages, worksharing has generally been
opposed by postal unions that fight against contracting out any Postal
Service functions. The postal unions contend that the discounts given
to big mailers rob the Postal Service of billions of dollars a year,
revenue that could be recovered if the work were brought back in-
house.
The Future of the Postal Service
Recognizing that the business model of the Postal Service had
become obsolete, in 1995 members of Congress began calling for
reform legislation. However, it took until December 2006 for the
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act to be signed into law, the
first major change to the Postal Service since 1971. This law aims to
stabilize postal rates for households and bulk mailers and to provide
the Postal Service with the tools to act and compete as a modern
business against UPS and FedEx. However, change will not come
immediately because some parts of the law will take as long as three
years to implement, and changes to postal service standards could
take longer (U.S. Congress 2006).
In return for putting more responsibility on the Postal Service to
keep costs in line and keep a close eye on the bottom line, the
legislation gives the Postal Service additional flexibility in the process
of setting rates. It directs a newly created Postal Regulatory Com-
mission to divide Postal Service products into two classes: (1) market-
dominant (monopoly) products such as first-class mail and parcels,
standard mail, periodicals, and bound printed matter; and (2) com-
petitive products such as priority and expedited mail, bulk parcel post,
bulk international mail, and mailgrams. Regarding the setting of rates,
the new law requires the Postal Service to ensure that revenue from
each competitive product covers its own costs. This requirement
prohibits the Postal Service from using revenue from market-
dominant products to subsidize competitive products, a practice that
private-sector carriers have long criticized. However, the Postal Ser-
vice will be able to alter rates, just as commercial business do, and can
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negotiate discounts and worksharing agreements for individual ship-
pers (Kosar 2007).
Moreover, the legislation limits rate increases for market-dominant
products to the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index, to
keep rates from rising above inflation. However, the law imposes no
price cap on competitive products whose prices reflect market con-
ditions and are set by the Postal Regulatory Commission. Sponsors of
the legislation hope that by capping market-dominant rates, consum-
ers will benefit from smaller, regular, and more predictable rate in-
creases. This will allow mail shippers to better forecast their costs.
The establishment of a rate cap for the Postal Service is intended to
increase incentives for the Postal Service to become more efficient.
However, the American Postal Workers Union, a critic of the new
law, contends that the rate cap will make it more difficult to bargain
for higher salaries, resulting in an artificial cap on postal workers’
wages. This comes at no surprise in view of the large compensation
premium that Postal Service workers receive relative to the compen-
sation of private-sector workers (Schuyler 2002).
The legislation also provides for a reduction in the Postal Service’s
revenue requirements that are built into requests for rate increases.
For example, the law transfers responsibility for military service ben-
efits payable to postal retirees to the Treasury Department, as is the
practice for federal government agencies. It also redirects money set
aside for postal retirement costs to a new trust fund that will finance
retiree health benefits. Moreover, the legislation achieves some sav-
ings on worker injury claims by requiring employees to take sick time
for three days before filing for workers compensation. The Postal
Service can use these savings to keep postal rate increases in check,
to pay down debt, and to fund retiree health costs.
To improve the transparency and accountability of the Postal Ser-
vice, the legislation requires postal officials to make many of the same
financial disclosures as public companies. The Postal Regulatory
Commission will have the power to issue subpoenas that forge deeper
into the Postal Service’s activities than its previous regulator
(O’Driscoll and Hoskins 2006).
The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act is intended to
solve the structural, legal, and financial constraints that have brought
the Postal Service to the brink of breakdown. Rather than creating a
new Postal Service based on the principle of privatization, the legis-
lation is incremental in that it allows the Postal Service to continue its
transformation efforts and cost-cutting measures. However, the leg-
islation did not include any of the workforce cost-decreasing mea-
sures recommended by the President’s Commission, including major
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changes to collective bargaining, salary comparability, and fringe ben-
efits, all of which are strongly opposed by postal unions. Nor did the
legislation address the problem of allowing the Postal Service to ra-
tionalize its outdated facilities network. Simply put, the legislation
fails to address the major cost problems that have pushed the Postal
Service toward financial breakdown.
Whether the legislation will work will depend on the ability of the
Postal Service to deliver cost-effective services to households, busi-
nesses, and nonprofit organizations. It remains to be seen if the new
legislation can offset challenges such as continued declines in the
volume of first-class mail, the use of fax machines, e-mail, and Inter-
net commerce, as well as increased competition from private carriers.
These factors will likely continue to burden the Postal Service and
present challenges to its business model, thus requiring more strin-
gent reforms in the future.
Conclusion
The business model of the Postal Service faces great challenges.
They stem from secular changes involving the substitution of elec-
tronic media, such as e-mail, for letter mail as well as competition that
the Postal Service faces from private express companies. Also, as a
governmental enterprise, the Postal Service lacks two major incen-
tives for cost containment and service improvement: It has no profit
incentive, and it is unable to go bankrupt. Recognizing these inad-
equacies, the Postal Service has favored a plan to transform itself by
initiating incremental reforms to make it operate more like a business.
However, privatization is likely to be much more effective than
public enterprise in providing incentives for the Postal Service to
succeed commercially. Although the Postal Service has privatized
some of its operations vis-a`-vis worksharing, its efforts have not gone
far enough to make it an efficient organization. At a minimum, ad-
ditional privatization will be necessary. This might consist of preserv-
ing the Postal Service monopoly on the last mile delivery, while open-
ing up the acceptance, transport, sorting, and processing of mail to
much greater competition. Although additional worksharing tends to
promote greater operating efficiencies, it is only those operations that
are workshared.
Conceivably, the entire Postal Service, not just pieces of it, could
be privatized through a carefully structured sale of the entire opera-
tion to private owners. The Postal Service could be set up like a
private corporation with the announcement that it will be completely
privatized within the next several years. During this transition period,
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its chief executive officer and board of directors would be delegated
the responsibility of achieving this objective. However, management
of such a liquidation would be extremely difficult, especially given the
enormous size of the Postal Service. Instead, partial privatization will
be the likely path that the Postal Service will follow in the near future,
especially in the work of expanding worksharing agreements with
private-sector firms.
Will the monopoly of the Postal Service on the delivery of letter
mail and access to the mailbox be removed? Will the Postal Service be
completely privatized? The answer is not in the foreseeable future. In
2003, the President’s Commission on the U.S. Postal Service recom-
mended decreasing the Postal Service’s monopoly over time as well as
removing legal obstacles to the closing of underutilized post offices.
They also would subject priority mail, expedited mail, parcel post, and
international mail to federal income taxation, antitrust laws, and
truth-in-advertising laws, thus nudging them toward conventional
business activities. However, letter mail would continue to be pro-
tected by the delivery monopoly, and the Postal Service would not be
completely privatized (Kosar 2005). Yet these recommendations have
not been enacted. As for the Postal Accountability and Enhancement
of 2006, it may provide the Postal Service some additional flexibility
to compete with private-sector firms. However, it is not clear that this
legislation will be able to offset the challenges of decreasing volume
of first-class mail.
Indeed, implementing any reform of the Postal System is difficult.
Numerous groups, including unions, prefer the status quo, and Con-
gress has found substantial postal reform to be too controversial. Yet
other industrialized countries have started serious efforts to allow
competition into their postal systems. Perhaps with the Internet
breathing down the postman’s back, Congress will be forced to imple-
ment stronger reforms, and the Postal Service will have to follow a
different path.
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